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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Timothy Robert Duane Wilkins appeals from the judgment entered upon 
the jury verdict finding him guilty of possession of methamphetamine and 
possession of drug paraphernalia, and from the district court's verdict finding that 
he is a persistent violator of the law. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Idaho State Police Trooper Sean Lind located and pulled over a truck that 
was the subject of a citizen's reckless driving complaint. (R., p.9; Tr., p.41, L.13 
- p.44, L.15.)1 The truck had also been reported stolen from a local car 
dealership.2 (R., p.9.) When Trooper Lind stopped the vehicle, Wilkins, 
immediately got out of the truck and walked back towards Trooper Lind. (Tr., 
p.46, Ls.21-24.) Trooper Lind called for assistance from another officer when 
Wilkins appeared "jumpy." (Tr., p.47, L.16 - p.48, L.8.) Wilkins had no insurance 
and no vehicle registration, and his driving privileges were suspended. (R., p.9; 
Tr., p.47, Ls.2-11.) Trooper Lind placed Wilkins under arrest for driving without 
privileges. (Tr., p.47, Ls.2-11.) 
1 In its respondent's brief, the state cites only to the transcript containing the trial 
and sentencing hearing. The state refers to this transcript as "Tr." 
2 The state also initially charged Wilkins with possession of a stolen vehicle. (R., 
pp.12-13.) However, the district court denied the state's motion to consolidate, 
for trial, that charge with Wilkins' drug possession and paraphernalia charges. 
(R., pp.52-53, 57.) The district court also precluded the state from presenting 
any evidence at the possession and paraphernalia trial that the vehicle was 
stolen. (Tr., p.26, L.8-p.27, L.1) 
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Trooper Lind and the assisting officer, Idaho State Police Trooper Jesse 
Spike, then performed an inventory search of the vehicle. (Tr., p.48, L9 - p.56, 
L.23; p.105, L9 - p.112, L.11.) Trooper Spike located a pipe, a lighter, and a 
baggie containing a substance later identified to be methamphetamine in an 
open front console compartment of the truck. (Tr., p.49, L.24 - p.56, L.23; p.106, 
L.16 - p.110, L.18; p.123, L.15 - p.126, L.13; State's exhibits 1-4.) The 
uncovered compartment was located just to the right of the stereo near the 
center of the dashboard. (Tr., p.50, Ls.13-16; State's exhibits 1-4.) When the 
officers informed Wilkins of their discovery of the methamphetamine and pipe, 
Wilkins became "very wound up" and "agitated," and accused Trooper Lind of 
planting the contraband. (Tr., p.54, L.25 - p.56, L.2; p.73, Ls.18-22; p.103, L.17 
- p.104, L.25.) 
The state charged Wilkins with possession of methamphetamine, 
possession of drug paraphernalia, driving without privileges, failure to provide 
proof of liability insurance, and the persistent violator sentencing enhancement. 
(R., pp.36-38.) Prior to trial, Wilkins pied guilty to driving without privileges and 
failure to provide proof of liability insurance. (R., pp.165-168.) After the trial, the 
jury found Wilkins guilty of both possession charges. (Tr., p.185, L.25 - p.186, 
L.8; R., pp.180, 183-185.) After Wilkins waived a jury trial with regard to the 
persistent violator enhancement, the district court found Wilkins was a persistent 
violator based on two prior felony convictions. (Tr., p.184, L.10 - p.185, L.5; 
p.195, L.14 - p.197, L.8.) 
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The district court imposed a unified ten year sentence, with five years 
fixed, for the possession of methamphetamine charge. (R., pp.183-185; Tr., 
p.293, Ls.7-13.) The district court entered concurrent sentences of 180 days 
each on the driving without privileges and possession of drug paraphernalia 
charges, and a fine for the insurance infraction. (R., pp.178-185; Tr., p.293, L.23 
- p.294, L.5.) Wilkins timely appealed. (9/17/10 "Notice of Appeal".)3 
3 On June 29, 2011, The Idaho Supreme Court granted Wilkins' motion to 
augment the record to include his 9/17/10 "Notice of Appeal." 
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ISSUES 
Wilkins states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Was the evidence sufficient to support Mr. Wilkins' 
conviction for possession of a controlled substance, 
possession of drug paraphernalia, and the finding that he 
was a persistent violator? 
2. Did the district court err when it relied on its own memory to 
find Mr. Wilkins to be a persistent violator? 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed an 
excessive sentence following Mr. Wilkins' conviction for 
possession of a controlled substance as a persistent 
violator? 
(Appellant's brief, p.6.) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Has Wilkins failed to show that the evidence was insufficient to convict him 
of possession of a controlled substance, possession of drug 
paraphernalia, and the persistent violator sentencing enhancement? 
2. Has Wilkins failed to show that the district court testified in the trial as a 
witness in violation of I.RE. 605? 
3. Has Wilkins failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing 
discretion? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Wilkins Has Failed To Show That The Evidence Supporting His Convictions Was 
Insufficient To Prove His Guilt 
A. Introduction 
Wilkins contends there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's 
verdicts finding him guilty of possession of methamphetamine and possession of 
drug paraphernalia, and the district court's verdict finding that he was a persistent 
violator. (Appellant's brief, pp.7-14.) A review of the record shows that each 
verdict was supported by substantial evidence. 
B. Standard Of Review 
An appellate court will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered upon 
a jury verdict if there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact 
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 
doubt. State v. Miller, 131 Idaho 288, 292, 955 P.2d 603, 607 (Ct. App. 1997); 
State v. Reyes, 121 Idaho 570, 826 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Hart, 112 
Idaho 759, 761, 735 P.2d 1070, 1072 (Ct. App. 1987). In conducting this review 
the appellate court will not substitute its view for that of the jury as to the 
credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, or the reasonable 
inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Miller, 131 Idaho at 292, 955 P.2d at 
607; State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101, 822 P.2d 998 (Ct. App. 1991); Hart, 112 
Idaho at 761, 735 P.2d at 1072. Moreover, the facts, and inferences to be drawn 
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from those facts, are construed in favor of upholding the jury's verdict. Miller, 
131 Idaho at 292, 955 P.2d at 607; Hart, 112 Idaho at 761, 735 P.2d at 1072. 
C. The State Presented Sufficient Evidence To Prove the Essential Elements 
Of Possession Of Methamphetamine And Possession Of Drug 
Paraphernalia 
Possession may be proven by either direct or circumstantial evidence. 
State v. Groce, 133 Idaho 144, 151, 983 P.2d 217, 224 (Ct. App. 1999). 
Possession may be either actual or constructive. State v. Warden, 97 Idaho 752, 
754, 554 P .2d 684, 686 (1976). Constructive possession "exists where a nexus 
between the accused and the substance is sufficiently proven so as to give rise 
to the reasonable inference that the accused was not simply a bystander but, 
rather, had the power and intent to exercise dominion and control over the 
substance." State v. Crawford, 130 Idaho 592, 595, 944 P.2d 727, 730 (Ct. App. 
1997). 
In this case, the state presented evidence sufficient to show that Wilkins 
constructively possessed the methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia. 
Specifically, the state presented evidence that a baggie containing 
methamphetamine, a pipe, and a lighter were located in an open dashboard 
compartment in a truck driven by Wilkins. (Tr., p.49, L.24 - p.56, L.23; p.106, 
L.16 - p.110, L.18; p.123, L.15- p.126, L.13; State's exhibits 1-4.) Nobody else 
was in the vehicle at the time of the traffic stop and discovery of the contraband. 
(Tr., p.54, Ls.3-4.) The jury heard detailed testimony regarding the placement of 
the compartment, pipe, and methamphetamine in relation to the truck's 
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dashboard and driver's seat, and viewed photographs admitted into evidence 
depicting the same.4 (Tr., p.48, L.15 - p.56, L.23; p.69, L.1 - p.71, L.13; p.81, 
L.16 - p.84, L.1; p.94, L.24 - p.100, L.3; p.106, L.18 - p.113, L.25; State's 
exhibits 1-4.) The compartment had a depth of approximately five inches, and 
appeared from the photos and testimony to be visible and accessible to a person 
sitting in the driver's seat. (Tr., p.48, L.15 - p.56, L.23; p.69, L.1 - p.71, L.13; 
p.81, L.16-p.84, L.1; p.94, L.24-p.100, L.3; p.106, L.18- p.113, L.25; State's 
exhibits 1-4) (from perspective of someone sitting in driver's seat, compartment 
was "three feet" away, and "mid- chest or just below chest height").) 
The jury also heard testimony from the officers describing Wilkins' 
"fidgety," "excited," and "jumpy" demeanor. (Tr., p.47, L.16 - p.48, L.8; p.54, 
L.16 - p.56, L.2; p.72, L.21 - p.73, L.7; p.103, L.10 - p.104, L.25.) Wilkins left 
the truck immediately after he was pulled over, apparently attempting to initiate 
contact with Trooper Lind at Lind's patrol vehicle, rather than at the truck he was 
driving. (Tr., p.46, Ls.21-24.) Wilkins' overall demeanor was concerning enough 
for Trooper Lind to request backup, something Trooper Spike testified that Lind 
does not generally do, and something that is not routine procedure for the Idaho 
State Police. (Tr., p.47, L.16 - p.48, L.8; p.72, Ls.15-17; p.102, L.25 - p.103, 
L. 7.) After Wilkins was informed that the methamphetarnine and pipe were found 
in his truck, he became "unglued," acting like a "caged animal." (Tr., p.73, Ls.1-
4 Trooper Lind moved one of the bags prior to taking the photographs depicted in 
Exhibits 2, 3, 4, and the bottom of Exhibit 1. (Tr., p.52, Ls.3-16; p.66, L.13 -
p.67, L.15.) At trial, Trooper Lind described this movement and used a pen to 
point to the exhibits and indicate where the objects had been originally. (Tr., 
p.94, L.24 - p.98, L.1.) 
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7; p.103, Ls.17-20.) Through a video of the incident, the jury was able to observe 
Wilkins' demeanor directly, and also evaluate the credibility of his denials made 
to the officers about his knowledge of the methamphetamine and paraphernalia. 
(Tr., p.59, L.13 - p.62, L.13; State's exhibit 7.) 
In contending that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions, 
Wilkins relies on State v. Burnside, 115 Idaho 882, 771 P .2d 546 (Ct. App. 1989). 
(Appellant's brief, pp.8-12.) In Burnside, the Idaho Court of Appeals held that the 
state presented insufficient evidence to support a conviction for possession of 
psilocybin mushrooms with intent to deliver where the mushrooms had been 
found in a vehicle. & at 885-886. However, Burnside can be easily 
distinguished from the present case. 
In Burnside, the drugs were found concealed in a black vinyl bag in a 
vehicle Burnside had been driving with another man as a passenger. & Before 
officers located the vinyl bag, Burnside told them that the bag was not his, a 
remark which the Court recognized as suggesting that Burnside knew of the 
presence of the drugs in the vehicle. 1.Q. However, at trial, the evidence 
suggested that Burnside may have sold the mushrooms to the passenger several 
hours earlier, in a motel room. & The Court noted that while Burnside's prior 
sale of the drugs in the motel room may have indicated that he possessed the 
drugs at an earlier time, it did not establish that he continued to possess them 
after the sale was consummated. & Instead, Burnside would have surrendered 
his right of possession upon receiving payment. & Thus, the Court of Appeals 
concluded that while the evidence may have been sufficient to show Burnside 
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had knowledge of the drugs in the vehicle, it was not sufficient to show he still 
had control over the drugs, and thus, the state failed to sufficiently prove 
constructive possession. ~ 
There is no such dichotomy in the present case. Wilkins was found with 
methamphetamine and a pipe in an open center compartment of a vehicle in 
which he was alone. Wilkins had exclusive possession of the vehicle where the 
drugs were found at the time of his arrest. Since there was no evidence of a 
prior sale or any other exchange agreement, if there was sufficient evidence that 
Wilkins had knowledge of the drugs, then there was necessarily sufficient 
evidence that Wilkins had control over the drugs. A rational jury could find that 
Wilkins had knowledge of the methamphetamine and pipe based on the 
placement of that contraband in a vehicle in which he was alone, Wilkins' 
demeanor before and after his arrest and the officers' discovery of the 
contraband, and the lack of credibility of his denials to the police officers. 
Wilkins also highlights the testimony of Noah Peterson, who testified in 
Wilkins' defense, and claimed ownership of the methamphetamine and pipe 
found in the vehicle Wilkins was driving. (Tr., p.141, L.4 - p.175, L.3.) 
Specifically, Peterson testified that on the day prior to Wilkins' arrest he smoked 
methamphetamine in the truck Wilkins had been driving while Wilkins was in his 
residence changing clothes, and that he had left the pipe and remaining 
methamphetamine in the car. (Tr., p.144, L.1 - p.152, L.20.) However, 
Peterson's testimony raised credibility issues. On cross-examination, Peterson 
acknowledged that he had been friends with Wilkins for several years, and that 
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he had recently made a similar claim of ownership of methamphetamine found in 
another criminal defendant's vehicle. (Tr., p.153, L.7 - p.171, L22.) Peterson 
also claimed that he had smoked the methamphetamine in the truck while 
Wilkins was in his residence so that he would not "tempt" Wilkins, but he then 
made no attempt to conceal the remaining methamphetamine when Wilkins 
returned to the truck. (Tr., p.164, Ls.23-25.) Further, as the district court 
recognized in denying Wilkins' motion for a new trial, the jury could have inferred 
from the evidence that had Peterson been testifying truthfully, then Wilkins 
should have smelled the smoked methamphetamine when he re-entered the car, 
approximately fifteen minutes after Peterson finished smoking the 
methamphetamine. (Tr., p.164, L.19 - p.165, L.6; p.228, L.12 - p.229, L.1.) 
It is the province of a jury to determine a witness's credibility (State v. 
Jones, 145 Idaho 639,641, 181 P.3d 1247, 1249 (Ct. App. 2008)), and certainly, 
a reasonable juror could have disregarded Peterson's testimony entirely, or found 
that both Wilkins and Peterson constructively possessed the methamphetamine 
and pipe. 
Because the state presented substantial evidence upon which a rational 
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of possession of 
methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia beyond a reasonable doubt, Wilkins 
has failed to show that there was insufficient evidence to support those 
convictions. 
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D. The State Presented Sufficient Evidence To Prove The Essential 
Elements Of The Persistent Violator Sentencing Enhancement 
The state also charged Wilkins with a persistent violator enhancement, 
I.C. § 19-2514, which applies to "[a]ny person convicted for the third time of a 
commission of a felony." The former convictions relied upon to support the 
persistent violator enhancement must be alleged in the indictment or information 
and proved at trial. State v. Medrain, 143 Idaho 329, 332, 14 P.3d 34, 37 (Ct. 
App. 2006) (citing State v. Cheatham, 139 Idaho 413,416, 80 P.3d 349, 352 (Ct. 
App. 2003) and State v. Martinez, 102 Idaho 875, 880, 643 P.2d 555, 560 (Ct. 
App. 1982)). The state is required to establish the identity of the defendant as 
the person formerly convicted beyond a reasonable doubt. Medrain, 143 Idaho 
at 332, 14 P.3d at 37 (citations omitted). 
A certified judgment of conviction accompanied by mug shots, fingerprint 
cards and testimony that those fingerprints are similar to the defendant's 
fingerprints, constitutes sufficient evidence to establish identity for purposes of 
the persistent violator enhancement. Martinez, 102 Idaho at 880, 643 P .2d at 
560. On the other hand, a certified copy of a judgment of conviction bearing the 
same name as the defendant, with nothing more, is insufficient to establish the 
identity of the person formerly convicted beyond a reasonable doubt. Medrain, 
143 Idaho at 332, 14 P.3d at 37 (citations omitted). 
The Idaho Court of Appeals recently considered, as a matter of first 
impression in Idaho, what type of evidence, beyond the broad guidelines of 
Martinez and Medrain, is sufficient to allow a reasonable trier of fact to identify a 
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defendant beyond a reasonable doubt as having been the same party implicated 
by the prior conviction. State v. Lawyer, 150 Idaho 170, _, 244 P.3d 1256, 
1258-1260 (Ct. App. 2010). The pleadings of the prior conviction at issue in 
Lawyer reflected: (1) the same name as the defendant; (2) the same date of birth 
as the defendant; (3) the same county as was host to the new criminal 
proceedings; and (4) the same crime as was committed in the new case. _lg_,_ In 
affirming Lawyer's conviction and sentence, the Court of Appeals recognized that 
such a combination of "both personal and nonpersonal evidence of identity" had 
been found in other states to be sufficient to support a conviction on appeal. Id. 
at_, 244 P.3d at 1260 (citations omitted). 
The evidence presented by the state to prove the persistent violator 
enhancement in the present case was similar to the evidence deemed sufficient 
in Lawyer. The state introduced two judgments for prior felony convictions. (Tr., 
p.190, L.25 - p.191, L.12; State's exhibits 9, 10.) Both judgments contained 
exactly the same name as the defendant charged in the present case, "Timothy 
Robert Duane Wilkins." (State's exhibits 7, 9, 1 0; R., p.36; Tr., p.195, Ls.17-22.) 
Both judgments contained exactly the same date of birth as was identified with 
Wilkins,  (State's Exhibits 7, 9, 1 O; R., p.36, Tr., p.195, Ls.19-25.) 
Further, both judgments referred to convictions in the same county as was host 
to the current criminal proceedings, Kootenai County. (State's exhibits 9, 1 O; R., 
p.36.) Finally, the prior crimes were similar to the current crimes - the state 
utilized prior convictions for felony possession of a controlled substance 
(methamphetamine), and possession of a controlled substance with the intent to 
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deliver, to enhance Wilkins' present conviction for possession of a controlled 
substance (methamphetamine). (State's exhibits 9, 1 O; R., pp.36-38.) 
Utilizing evidence that combined both "personal and nonpersonal 
evidence of identity," the state presented sufficient evidence for the district court 
to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Wilkins was previously convicted of two 
prior felonies. Wilkins has failed to show that the state's evidence was 
insufficient. 
11. 
Wilkins Has Failed To Show That The District Court Judge Testified As A 
Witness In Violation of I.R.E. 605 
A. Introduction 
Wilkins next contends that the district court testified as a witness by 
relying on his own memory to find that Wilkins was previously been convicted of 
two felonies in violation of I.R.E. 605. (Appellant's brief, pp.14-15.) While the 
district court verbally acknowledged recognizing Wilkins from prior courtroom 
appearances, a review of the context surrounding those comments reveals that 
the court did not rely on any such knowledge to find that Wilkins is a persistent 
violator. Wilkins has failed to affirmatively show error. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Generally, error will not be presumed on appeal, but must be affirmatively 
shown in the record. State v. Mowrey, 128 Idaho 804, 805, 919 P.2d 333, 334 
(1996). 
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C. The District Court Did Not Rely On Its Own Memory 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 605(a)5 precludes a presiding trial judge from 
testifying in that trial as a witness. The state agrees with Wilkins, that, pursuant 
to I.R.E. 605, a district court, acting as fact finder in a persistent violator 
enhancement trial may not rely on his own personal knowledge of a defendant's 
prior felony convictions to find a conviction. However, in this case, an 
examination of the entire context of the district court's comments in question 
reveal that while he acknowledged his familiarity with Wilkins, he did not, in fact, 
rely on any of his own specific personal knowledge of Wilkins' prior convictions to 
find that he was a persistent violator. 
Well, the Court has before it Exhibits 9 and 10. Those 
exhibits appear to be authentic judgments for retained jurisdiction in 
Cases No. 07-10846 and 08-26542. They both pertain to Timothy 
Robert Duane Wilkins. The same name that this particular 
defendant has been identified is. [sic] They both pertain to the -
and the Court did hear on the videotape and the officer's testimony 
that this defendant gave that name to the officer in particular. And 
that the date of birth listed in these judgments was of 1973. 
The Court heard this particular individual on the videotape give that 
date of birth for himself to Corporal Lind. And the Court, also I have 
to say, has an independent memory of Mr. Wilkins as having been 
before the Court before. Without looking at these judgments, I 
could not have said what he has been convicted of, whether it was 
a felony or a misdemeanor, without reviewing the documents. But I 
do recognize Mr. Wilkins. And when I look at these particular 
judgments I do recognize Timothy Robert Duane Wilkins of these 
judgments to be the Mr. Wilkins that is the Defendant in this 
particular case. 
5 By language of the rule, no trial objection is necessarily to preserve an I.R.E. 
605 argument on appeal. In any event, Wilkins argued below that the district 
court could not rely on its personal knowledge to find that Wilkins was a 
persistent violator. (Tr., p.192, Ls.17-22.) 
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These judgments do satisfy the Court that they are 
judgments of convictions for felony offenses. The Court is satisfied 
that they are separate felony offenses. Counsel's argument about 
whether there were two prior sentencing dates in an argument that 
this court takes more to the issue of whether two prior offenses can 
be established, for example, by being convicted of a Count I and a 
Count 11 on the same Information on the same date as a 
sentencing. Are those two prior felonies for the purposes of an 
enhancement? Or are they one felony sentencing event? I'm 
satisfied that these are separate events. They are separate case 
numbers. They have separate dates with my signatures; one of 
November 6th of 2007, the other of March 9th of 2009. 
The Court is recognizing that it is held to the standard of 
evaluating this as proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court 
certainly is aware of what the definition for beyond a reasonable 
doubt is. And the Court finds that the State has proved the 
existence of two prior felony conviction occasions of Timothy 
Robert Duane Wilkins with the date of birth that's listed as having 
been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. And I do find the Part II 
to be proved. 
(Tr., p.195, L.14-p.197, L.8.) 
It appears the district court, perhaps sensitive to its role as fact finder on 
the persistent violator issue, wished to candidly acknowledge to the parties that 
he did, in fact, personally recognize Wilkins. The district court judge however 
clarified that while he recognized Wilkins, he could not recall, based simply on 
that familiarity, whether Wilkins had previously been convicted of misdemeanors, 
or felonies. (Tr., p.195, L.25 - p.196, L.6.) 
It is clear that the district court relied on the judgments offered by the 
state, and not on its familiarity with Wilkins, to find that Wilkins had been 
convicted of two prior felonies as evidenced by the district court's specific 
discussion of the judgments submitted by the state, and its findings that those 
judgments reflected Wilkins' full name and date of birth. (Tr., p.195, Ls.14-25.), 
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The court also specifically discussed its satisfaction with the judgments as 
evidence of prior convictions for separate felony offenses, and found that the "the 
state [had] proved the existence of two prior felony conviction occasions of 
Timothy Robert Duane Wilkins .... " (Tr., p.196, L.10 - p.197, L.8; p.197, Ls.3-6 
(emphasis added).) 
Wilkins has failed to meet his burden to affirmatively show that the district 
court's mere acknowledgment of its familiarity with Wilkins contributed to its 
verdict finding that Wilkins was a persistent violator. Wilkins has thus failed to 
show that the distinct court testified as a witness in this case in violation of I.R.E. 
605. 
D. Even If the District Court Violated I.R.E. 605(a) By Considering Its Prior 
Knowledge In Making Its Determination That Wilkins Was A Persistent 
Violator. Any Such Error Is Harmless 
Even if Wilkins has shown that the district court erred by considering its 
own personal knowledge of Wilkins' prior criminal convictions in finding that 
Wilkins was a persistent violator, any such error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
While no Idaho appellate court has had the opportunity to specifically 
apply a harmless error analysis to an I.R.E. 605(a) violation, generally, where 
evidence is erroneously admitted, the test for determining if the error was 
harmless is "'whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence 
complained of might have contributed to the conviction." State v. Jones, 125 
Idaho 477, 488, 873 P.2d 122, 133 (1994) (quoting State v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 
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742, 762, 810 P.2d 680, 700 (1991)). The State has the burden of demonstrating 
that an objected-to, non-constitutionally-based error is harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, _, 245 P.3d 961, 974 (2010). 
In this case, any error was harmless because of the overwhelming 
evidence, as discussed above, that Wilkins had previously been convicted of two 
prior felonies. The state submitted two prior judgments from Kootenai County 
that referenced two separate felony drug convictions, and contained Wilkins' full 
and exact name, and Wilkins' full and exact date of birth. (Tr., p.190, L.25 -
p.191, L.12; State's exhibits 9, 10.) Regardless of any erroneous consideration 
the district court gave to its previous familiarity with Wilkins, it still would have 
found Wilkins was a persistent violator absent that personal knowledge. Any 
error was thus harmless. 
111. 
Wilkins Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing 
Discretion 
A. Introduction 
Wilkins finally asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it 
imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with five years fixed, upon his 
conviction for possession of a controlled substance, enhanced by the persistent 
violator sentencing enhancement. (Appellant's brief, pp.15-18.) Wilkins has 
failed to establish an abuse of discretion, considering the objectives of 
sentencing, his extensive criminal history, and previous failures in complying with 
community supervision. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
When a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellate court will review 
only for an abuse of discretion. State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 
397, 401 (2007). The appellant has the burden of demonstrating that the 
sentencing court abused its discretion. lil 
C. Wilkins Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its 
Sentencing Discretion 
To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appellant 
must establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was 
excessive. Farwell, 144 Idaho at 736, 170 P.3d at 401. To establish that the 
sentence was excessive, he must demonstrate that reasonable minds could not 
conclude the sentence was appropriate to accomplish the sentencing goals of 
protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution. lil 
Wilkins has failed to demonstrate that the sentence he received for 
possession of methamphetamine was an abuse of discretion. A sentence of 
confinement is reasonable if "it appears necessary to accomplish the primary 
objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of 
deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution." State v. Dushkin, 124 Idaho 184, 185, 
857 P.2d 663, 664 (Ct. App. 1993). A sentence need not serve all of the 
sentencing goals, or weigh each one equally. lil 
Before pronouncing sentence, the district court discussed its consideration 
of the appropriate sentencing factors. (Tr., p.287, L.20 - p.288, L.4.) The court 
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indicated that it had reviewed several letters Wilkins had written to the court, as 
well as several letters written by other people in support of Wilkins. (Tr., p.215, 
L.18 - p.216, L.12.) The court reviewed a neuropsychological evaluation and the 
PSI. (Tr., p.216, Ls.13-22.) The district court gave Wilkins the opportunity to 
make any corrections to the PSI, and Wilkins made several. (Tr., p.250, L.5 -
p.261, L.3.) The district court considered the supportive testimony of Wilkins' 
brother made at the sentencing hearings, and recognized, " ... your brother's 
description of you seems accurate. You seem like a nice guy. You seem like a 
nice man." (Tr., p.292, Ls.11-14.) 
However, the district court also recognized, correctly, that Wilkins " ... just 
can't stop committing these law violations. And when [he does commit these 
crimes] our community, it's put at risk. It diminishes its value. I mean, every time 
a crime is committed, it hurts people. It hurts everyone around you. It hurts the 
people that you steal from. It hurts the people you get in a fight with. It hurts 
everybody. It does diminish our society." (Tr., p.292, Ls.13-20.) Indeed, Wilkins' 
criminal history is startling. At the time of his conviction in the present case, 
Wilkins was already on probation for two prior felony methamphetamine 
convictions, one of which was a delivery conviction. (PSI, pp.10-12; Tr., p.215, 
Ls.2-12, p.293, Ls.11-21.) In addition, Wilkins has approximately 45 prior 
criminal convictions, including convictions for burglary, obstruct and delay, 
possession of drug paraphernalia, petit theft, providing false information, driving 
a vehicle without the owner's permission, telephone harassment, misdemeanor 
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eluding, battery, misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance, failing to 
stop at an accident, and reckless driving. (PSI, pp.3-12.) 
At the same hearing where Wilkins was sentenced on the 
methamphetamine possession charge, the district court also revoked Wilkins' 
probation on two prior felonies, and imposed those sentences (two years fixed 
plus five indeterminate, and three years fixed plus four years indeterminate, 
respectively) to run concurrently with each other, and with each of his new 
sentences. (Tr., p.293, Ls.14-22.) The district court recognized that despite 
having previously gone against recommendations of the IDOC and probation 
officers, and giving Wilkins multiple opportunities for community supervision, 
Wilkins had failed to take advantage of those opportunities: 
We tried the possession of methamphetamine, the first 
charge, in 2007. Your criminal history deserved a rider. And we 
tried that rider. And that did recommend relinquishing jurisdiction. 
And the prison authorities said, "Don't try probation. Just send this 
man to the penitentiary." I didn't follow that recommendation. I 
placed you out on probation in April of 2008. Within six months you 
violated that probation in a pretty significant way, that being 
possessing the meth with intent to deliver. 
At that point the recommendation was, "Send this man to the 
penitentiary. Don't try a rider." I didn't follow that recommendation. 
I tried a second rider. And that second rider you did earn a 
recommendation of probation. And I put you out on probation 
August 18 of 2008. There was a PV within just a few months. The 
recommendation there was send this man to prison. I said, "No." I 
think there was a lot of confusion there. I gave you a chance again 
at probation. Put you back out on probation. Before very long at 
all, we're in the situation that is caught on this videotape [in the 
present case]. 
(Tr., p.291, Ls.3-23.) 
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After considering the facts of the case and applying the objectives of 
criminal punishment, the court reasonably determined that imposing a unified 
sentence of ten years with five years fixed for felony methamphetamine 
possession, enhanced by the persistent violator enhancement, was appropriate. 
Under any reasonable view of the facts, Wilkins has failed to establish an abuse 
of discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Timothy Wilkins' 
conviction and sentence. 
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